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b i g  d a T a  a n d  m a r k e T  p o w e r
aLexanDre De streeL*
I. The Big Data value chain
according to de mauro et al ., 1 big data “is the information asset character-
ized by such a high volume, velocity and variety to require specific tech-
nology and analytical methods for its transformation into value .” thus, the 
difference between data and big data is the famous four v’s made possible 
by technological progress: the volume of data processed, the variety of 
data aggregated, the velocity at which data is collected and used and the 
value of the information found in the data .
as explained by oecd 2 or mayer-schonberger and cukier, 3 big data are col-
lected, exchanged, stored and value is extracted in a complex eco-system 
made of many related markets which are often multi-sided: first (i)  data 
are collected directly from users and from machines in many different ways 
or can be bought from data brokers; 4 then (ii) data are stored on internal 
* professor of law at the university of namur, director centre information law and society 
(crids), joint-academic director centre on regulation in europe (cerre) . this paper is 
partly based on a policy report done in February 2017 for the centre on regulation in europe 
(cerre) on big data and competition policy by marc Bourreau, aLexanDre De streeL and inge 
graef .
1 a . De mauro, m . greco and m . grimaLDi, “a Formal definition of big data based on its 
essential Features”, Library Review 65(3), 2016, 122-135 .
2 oecd, Data-Driven Innovation: Big Data for Growth and Well-Being, oecd publications, 
2015 and oecd, Big Data: Bringing competition policy to the digital era, daF/
comp(2016)14 .
3 v . mayer-schönBerger and k . cuKier, Big Data: A Revolution that will transform how we live, 
work and think, eamon dolan/mariner books, 2013 .
4 data brokers have been defined by the us Ftc as “companies whose primary business is 
collecting personal information about consumers from a variety of sources and aggre-
gating, analysing, and sharing that information, or information derived from it, for 
purposes such as marketing products, verifying an individual’s identity, or detecting 
fraud”: Federal trade commission (2014), Data Brokers: A Call for Transparency and 
Accountability . the consultancy idc has a broader concept of data marketplace defined as 
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servers or on external cloud computing services; and finally (iii) data are 
analysed with software analytics and the valuable information can be used 
to improve and personalise products’ characteristics and prices as well as 
their marketing, to improve process and organisation or for many other 
purposes such as controlling epidemics or managing emergencies .
a. Data collection
a firm may collect data directly, usually having a direct contact with the 
person or the object from which the data is collected, or indirectly, usually 
by buying the data from data brokers .
Firms may collect personal and non-personal data about users, as well as 
machines, in many different online and offline ways . For the case of the 
online collection of personal information, (i) some information is publicly 
observed through device, operating system or ip address; (ii) other infor-
mation is voluntarily provided by the consumers either with knowledge 
when registering to a website (such as name, date of birth, email or postal 
address for delivery) or often without knowledge when logging into a web-
site (login-based data: such as products the consumer is looking for, pur-
chases); (iii) information can also be collected by tracking the consumer 
online with different means, browser and device fingerprinting, history 
sniffing, cross-device tracking .
Firms may also procure data from third parties, even though this remains 
a marginal practice in europe today . according to a recent study done for 
the european commission, data trading only accounted for 4% of the com-
panies surveyed . 5 however, the secondary market for data is not yet well 
“a third party, cloud-based software platform providing Internet access to a disparate set of 
external data sources for use in IT systems by business, government or non-profit organi-
zations. The marketplace operator will manage payment mechanisms to reimburse each 
dataset owner/provider for data use, as necessary. Optionally, the marketplace provider 
may provide access to analysis tools that can operate on the data.”: idc (2016), Europe’s 
Data Marketplaces – Current Status and Future Perspectives, report for the european 
commission . idc notes that in their simplest form, data marketplaces are online stores where 
firms can buy and sell data .
5 on the basis of a business models survey done by deloitte, the european commission observes 
that “in the vast majority of cases (78% of the companies surveyed) data is generated and 
analysed in-house by the company or by a sub-contractor. Vertical integration remains the 
principal strategy in the sectors surveyed. Data stays within an organisation and is not 
traded with third parties. This is particularly the case in sectors with a high presence of 
large, technologically advanced companies, such as banks and telecom providers or automo-
tive and machinery producers .”: commission staff working document of 10 january 2017 on 
the free flow of data and emerging issues of the european data economy, swd(2017) 2, p . 15 . 
For a broad overview of the data landscape in the european union, see http://datalandscape .eu/ .
 Big Data anD marKet PoWer
 bruylant 99
understood by public authorities . in the us, a committee of the senate 
in 2013 6 and the Federal trade commission in 2014 7 conducted inquiries 
to better understand those markets . the Ftc concluded that: (i) the us 
data broker industry is complex with multiple companies exchanging lots 
of data between themselves; (ii) data brokers have a vast amount of data 
on almost every us household and commercial transaction; 8 (iii) data bro-
kers combine offline and online data from multiple different sources and it 
is very difficult for a consumer to know and determine how a data broker 
obtained her data; (iv) data brokers analyse the data and make inference 
about the consumers, placing them into categories that may be sensitive . 9
B. Data storage and cloud computing
the storage of massive quantities of data requires large data centres con-
sisting of big clusters of computers connected by fast local area networks . 
those data centres are expensive to build and characterised by important 
economies of scale . however, the development of cloud computing 10 allows 
small firms to rent instead of owning the data centres, thereby converting 
6 us senate committee on commerce, science and transportation (2013), A Review of the 
Data Broker Industry: Collection, Use and Sale of Consumer Data for Marketing Purposes, 
staff report .
7 this report examines the following 9 data brokers: acxiom, corelogic, datalogix, ebureau, 
id analytics, intelius, peekyou, rapleaf, and recorded Future .
8 according to the Ftc report, one data broker’s database has information on 1 .4 billion 
consumer transactions and over 700 billion aggregated data elements; another data broker’s 
database covers one trillion dollars in consumer transactions; and yet another data broker 
adds three billion new records each month to its databases . most importantly, data brokers 
hold a vast array of information on individual consumers . For example, one of the nine data 
brokers has 3000 data segments for nearly every u .s . consumer . based on companies’ reports, 
lambrecht and tucker note that acxiom has multi-sourced insight into approximately 
700 million consumers worldwide with over 1,600 pieces of separate data on each consumer; 
datalogix asserts that its data includes almost every u .s . household; bluekai states that it 
has data on 750 million unique users per month with an average of 10-15 attributes per user: 
a . LamBrecht and c . tucKer, “can big data protect a Firm from competition?”, 2015, available 
on ssrn .
9 potentially sensitive categories include those that primarily focus on ethnicity and income 
levels, such as “urban scramble” and “mobile mixers,” both of which include a high concen-
tration of latinos and african americans with low incomes . other potentially sensitive cate-
gories highlight a consumer’s age such as “rural everlasting,” which includes single men 
and women over the age of 66 with “low educational attainment and low net worths,” while 
“married sophisticates” includes thirty-something couples in the “upper-middle class with no 
children .” yet other potentially sensitive categories highlight certain health-related topics or 
conditions, such as “expectant parent,” “diabetes interest,” and “cholesterol Focus .”
10 cloud computing service is defined by eu law as a digital service that enables access to a 
scalable and elastic pool of shareable computing resources: article 4(19) of the directive 
2016/1148 on network information security .
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their fixed costs into variable costs . 11 For the cloud computing market to 
function properly, the costs of switching between providers need not to be 
too high, which raises the issues of interoperability and portability in the 
cloud . 12 moreover, the competition among cloud providers may be limited 
by data localisation restrictions which can be important for certain types 
of privately owned data, in particular for health, financial and gaming/
gambling data as well as for publicly owned data . 13
c. Data analytics and use
the third step in the big data value chain is the analysis of those data 
to extract relevant information, mainly with correlation patterns . the 
information found in the data can have multiple uses: they can improve 
products for all thanks to a better understanding of consumers’ needs . 
those improved products can be data-rich (mainly intangible) such as a 
map or data-less rich (more tangible) such as a drive-less car; 14 they can 
better personalise products’ prices or marketing strategies; they can also 
improve process, marketing and organisation, thereby increasing produc-
tive and dynamic efficiencies .
data analytics is done by applications and algorithms which are increas-
ingly learning by themselves . the development and the improvement of 
those algorithms are based on many inputs such as data, skilled and crea-
tive labour force (in particular computer scientists and engineers) or capi-
tal . thus, data are important but probably not the most important input 
as mentioned by lerner . 15 analytical applications and algorithms can be 
developed in-house and, for some, may require important investment in 
getting the best skills and volume of data . they may also be obtained from 
11 s .m . greenstein, a . goLDfarB, and c . tucKer, The Economics of Digitization, edward elgar, 
2013 .
12 communication of the commission of 19 april 2016, european cloud initiative – building a 
competitive data and knowledge economy in europe, com(2016) 178; european commission 
staff working document of 10 january 2017 on the free flow of data and emerging issues of 
the european data economy, swd(2017) 2, pp . 5-10 .
13 to remove those restrictions, the commission has recently propose a regulation to stimulate 
the flow of data across the member states: proposal from the commission of 13 september 
2017 for a regulation on a framework for the free flow of non-personal data in the european 
union, com(2017) 495 .
14 j . Prüfer and c . schottmüLLer, “competing with big data”, center discussion paper; 
vol .  2017-007 have built a model where firms can leverage their position from data-rich 
markets (for instance maps) to data-less rich markets (for instance drive-less cars) with prod-
ucts improvements based on data .
15 a . Lerner, “the role of ‘big data’ in online platform competition”, 2014, available on ssrn .
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a third party . in this case, like for cloud computing, the fixed development 
costs can be converted into variable costs .
D. the broader context
the big data eco-system is complex and involves many firms active on 
related markets which are often multi-sided . therefore when assessing 
market power, competition authorities should keep a broad view taking 
into account the main characteristics of the eco-system, which are: 16 (i) the 
presence of direct and indirect network effects which may lead to snow-
ball effects where the markets tip in favour of a small number of players; 17 
(ii) the steep experience curve of the self-learning algorithms which may 
substantially increase the first-mover advantage and also lead to snow-
ball effects and market tipping; (iii) the relationships between the different 
markets, often of multi-sided nature, which may, in some circumstances, 
ease the leverage of a dominant position from one market to another; (iv) 
the extensive multi-homing of customers which may be affiliated to sev-
eral online platforms at the same time; 18 (v) the rate of innovation which 
is quick and often unpredictable and disruptive, leading to possible rapid 
displacement of powerful but lazy firms .
therefore, when running an antitrust case in a big data industry, competi-
tion agencies should take into account the general characteristics of the 
big data eco-system which may, in some circumstances, amplify some of 
the effects of data control . in particular, they should take into account 
the direct and indirect network effects on the demand side and the multi-
sidedness of the markets and leveraging possibilities on the supply side . 
the agencies should also adopt a dynamic view of market evolution with-
out trying to predict or, worse, shape the future technology and market 
evolutions .
16 autorité de la concurrence and bundeskartellamt, Competition law and data, 2016, pp . 26-30 
and uk house of lords, Online Platforms and the Digital Single Market, report of the select 
committee on european union, 2016, chapter 4 .
17 p . BeLLefLamme and m . Peitz, Industrial Organisation: Markets and Strategies, 2nd ed ., 
cambridge university press, 2015; c . shapiro and h . varian, Information Rules – A Strategic 
Guide in the Information Society, harvard business school press, 1999 . network effects 
often change the type of competition, which is often for the market (schumpeterian) rather 
than in the market .
18 multi-homing has been recognised by the general court of the eu as a mitigating factor for 
finding dominance when it upheld the commission approval of the acquisition of skype by 




II. Dataset and market power
to determine whether the control of a dataset can be a source of market 
power in a big data value chain, a joint report by the French autorité de la 
concurrence and the german bundeskartellambt 19 mentions two relevant 
factors to analyse: (i) the scarcity (or ease of replicability) of data and 
(ii) whether the scale/scope of data collection matters to competitive per-
formance . more generally, it is important to assess the effects of the pos-
sible entry barriers in the main steps of this value chain . this assessment 
should be done on a case-by-case basis and depends very much on the type 
of data and the type of use, in particular its algorithmic treatment, of such 
data . 20 this paper focuses on data collection and data analysis where the 
risks of entry barriers, because of potential non-replicability, are a priori 
higher than for data storage .
a. Data collection
1. Costs of collecting data
one of the inherent characteristics of data, as many intangible goods, 
is the non-rivalry which means that the same data can be collected and 
used many times without losing value . 21 this fundamental characteristic 
decreases, ceteris paribus, the cost of collection as data collection by one 
firm does not impede other firms to do the same .
however, technical, legal or contractual restrictions may weaken or even 
remove the inherent non-rivalry of data to make them exclusive: 22 (i) techni-
cal barriers, such as encryption techniques, can make the collection of data 
more difficult or even impossible; (ii) some of the legal rules applicable to 
personal or non-personal data 23 increase the costs of collection, in particular 
19 autorité de la concurrence and bundeskartellamt, Competition law and data, 2016, p . 35 .
20 d .l . ruBinfeLD and m .s . gaL, “access barriers to big data”, Arizona Law Review 59, 2017, 
339 . For instance, the 2014 doj’s action against the merger of Bazaarvoice and its leading 
rival Power-Reviews established that data can serve as an entry barrier in the market for 
rating and review platforms: doj, antitrust division, competitive impact statement of 8 may 
2014, 13-cv-00133 who, http://www .justice .gov/atr/case-document/file/488826/download .
21 this is why the often used analogy between data and oil is misleading .
22 see i . graef, EU Competition Law, Data Protection and Online Platforms: Data as Essential 
Facility, kluwer law international, 2016 .
23 For a description of those rules, see european commission staff working document of 
10 january 2017 on the free flow of data and emerging issues of the european data economy, 
swd(2017) 2, pp . 19-22; m . Bourreau, a . De streeL, i . graef, big data and competition policy, 
cerre report, 2017, pp . 15-28 .
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for personal data whose means of collection are limited by the general data 
protection rules and even more by the telecom specific data protection rules; 
(iii) contractual barriers such as exclusivity clauses, on the transfer of data . 24
in some cases, data are collected for their own sake and the collecting 
firm is ready to invest solely to gather data . this was the traditional busi-
ness model of polling institutes and market research firms such as gFk 
or tns or financial information companies such as bloomberg or reuters . 
this is also the new business model of the (often) internet firms offer-
ing products which are supposedly free because they are not paid with 
money but with data (whose value has increased with the development of 
big data) . interestingly, this new business model exhibits in general more 
network and experience effects than the traditional model and may lead 
to large platforms offering supposedly free services and collecting many 
(often personal) data . 25 in other cases, data are collected as by-product of 
the selling of another goods or services and the collecting firm does not 
invest specifically to gather the data . the standard example is customers’ 
lists that firms are building over time as they sell their products . this data 
collection as by-product increases with proliferation of connected devices 
and the diminishing costs of information storage . the cost of collection 
is obviously higher when data are collected for their own sake than as 
by-product . to be sure, those are two extreme cases and reality often lies 
in-between . indeed, there are some cases where a firm may want to invest 
in improving its products just to get better data as by-products .
2. Antitrust assessment of data availability 
and replicability
on the basis of the availability of data and their collection costs, the com-
petition agencies have determined in several cases whether datasets were 
replicable .
in some merger cases involving data-rich internet firms, the commission 
concluded that datasets of the merging parties were replicable, hence the 
combination of those data would not significantly impede competition . in 
Google/DoubleClick, 26 the commission considered that the combination of 
24 For an analysis of some of those contractual clauses, see osBorne cLarK, Legal study on 
ownership and access to data, study for the european commission, 2016 .
25 see also autorité de la concurrence and bundeskartellamt, Competition law and data, 2016, 
p . 38 .
26 commission decision of 11 march 2008, case m .4731 Google/ DoubleClick, paras . 364-366 .
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the information on search behaviour from google and web-browsing behav-
iour from doubleclick was already available to a number of google’s com-
petitors, hence would not give the merged entity a competitive advantage . 
in Facebook/WhatsApp, 27 the commission considered that a large amount 
of internet user data that are valuable for online advertising are not within 
the exclusive control of Facebook . therefore, even if Facebook would use 
whatsapp as a potential source for user data to improve Facebook’s target 
advertising, this would not significantly impede competition on the online 
advertising market . 28 in Microsoft/LinkedIn the commission considered 
that no competition concerns on the market for online advertising arose 
from the concentration of the parties’ user data that can be used for adver-
tising purposes because a large amount of such user data would continue 
to be available after the transaction . 29
however, in abuse of dominance cases, some national competition authori-
ties decided that customer lists gathered by firms enjoying a legal monop-
oly may not be reproducible by competitors 30 and cannot be used to launch 
other services which are under competition .
in september 2014, the autorité de la concurrence adopted an interim deci-
sion in which it found gdF suez (now engie) capable of taking advantage 
of its dominant position in the market for natural gas by using customer 
files it had inherited from its former monopoly status to launch offers at 
market prices outside the scope of its public service obligation . as regards 
the reproducibility of the database, the French agency considered that it 
was not reasonably possible for the competitors to reproduce the advan-
tage held by gdF suez or to rely on other databases from which informa-
tion could be retrieved that was effective for prospecting new customers 
in the market for the supply of gas . in march 2017, the French authority 
condemned engie and imposed a fine of 100m € . 31
27 commission decision of 3 october 2014, case m .7217 Facebook/WhatsApp, paras . 167-189 .
28 note that at the time of the merger in august 2014, Facebook indicated to the commission that 
it was unable to establish a reliable automated matching between Facebook and whatsapp 
users’ accounts . in august 2016, whatsapp announced the possibility of linking whatsapp 
user phone with Facebook user identities and it appears that technical possibilities of auto-
matic matching existed already in 2014 contrary to Facebook allegation . on that basis, the 
commission fined Facebook €110 million for providing misleading information: commission 
decision of 18 may 2017, case m .8228 Facebook/WhatsApp .
29 commission decision of 6 december 2016, case m . 8124 Microsoft/LinkedIn .
30 For a more elaborate analysis of indispensability of data, see i . graef, op. cit., pp . 270-273 .
31 autorité de la concurrence, décision 14-mc-02 du 9 septembre 2014 relative à une demande 
de mesures conservatoires présentée par la société direct energie dans les secteurs du gaz et 
de l’électricité, paras . 147-154; décision 17-d-06 du 21 mars 2017 .
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in september 2015, the belgian competition authority imposed a fine on the 
national lottery for having abused its dominance in the belgian market 
for public lotteries in which it has a legal monopoly . when entering the 
competitive market for sports betting in 2013, the national lottery used 
the contact details of individuals contained in a database that it had estab-
lished in the context of its legal monopoly in order to send a one-off pro-
motional email for the launch of its new sports betting product scooore! . 32 
given its nature and size, the belgian competition authority concluded that 
the contact details could not have been reproduced by competitors in the 
market at reasonable financial conditions and within a reasonable period 
of time . 33
B. Data analysis
the relationship between, on the one hand, the volume, the variety and the 
velocity of the data and, on the other hand, the quality of the analytical 
tools (often a computer algorithm) and the value of the inferred informa-
tion is complex and changing with rapid progress in artificial intelligence . 
it mainly depends on the type of data and analysis performed .
1. Volume of data: the economies of scale
the marginal return of having more data depends very much on the type of 
data and the type of analysis which is done . economies of scale in data use 
may be low when data are used for inference purpose, but higher for other 
usages . For search services, the economies of scale are lower for head 
queries which are frequently entered by users than for tail queries 34 which 
are rarer . as noted by the german monopolkommission: “while the added 
value of a frequently searched term can thus be very low, seldom-made 
search queries may make a major contribution towards improving search 
results . such infrequent search queries are likely to particularly include 
those search queries concerning for instance current events with regard to 
32 belgian competition authority, beslissing bma-2015-p/k-27-aud van 22 september 2015, Zaken 
nr . mede-p/k-13/0012 en conc-p/k-13/0013, Stanleybet Belgium NV/Stanley International 
Betting Ltd en Sagevas S.A./World Football Association S.P.R.L./Samenwerkende 
Nevenmaatschappij Belgische PMU S.C.R.L. t. Nationale Loterij NV, paras . 44-48 .
33 Ibidem, paras . 69-70 .
34 a . Lerner, op. cit. defines tail queries as including misspelled queries, addresses, specific 
product descriptions or model numbers, and detailed queries composed of multiple terms .
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which there is as yet no information on users’ conduct, and search queries 
consisting of several terms, “long-tail queries” . 35
however, the level of those scale economies is not clear . some authors 
like lerner, 36 lambrecht and trucker, 37 or sokol and comerford 38 submit 
that the scale economies are low even for tail queries and that there is 
a diminishing marginal return of data both for head and tail queries . 39 
others like mc afee find that more data matters for tail queries . in addi-
tion, in the context of the Microsoft/Yahoo! Search Business merger deci-
sion, microsoft argued that with larger scale a search engine can run tests 
on how to improve the algorithm and that it is possible to experiment more 
and faster as traffic volume increases because experimental traffic will 
take up a smaller proportion of overall traffic . 40 the extent of the econo-
mies of scale is thus an empirical question which should be tested in each 
case on the basis of the type of data and application at hand . in particular, 
the necessity of having more data to improve the quality of the application 
and the algorithm should be carefully analysed .
2. Variety of data: the economies of scope
another characteristic of the big data resides in the capacity and the 
importance of combining different types of data, which points to the econ-
omies of scope . as noted by the us executive office of the president, 41 
the combination of data from different sources “may uncover new mean-
ings . in particular, data fusion can result in the identification of individual 
people, the creation of profiles of an individual, and the tracking of an 
individual’s activities .” 42 similarly, the european commission states, in its 
Google/DoubleClick merger decision, that “competition based on the qual-
ity of collected data thus is not only decided by virtue of the sheer size 
35 monopolkommission, Competition policy: The challenge of digital markets, special 
report 68, 2015, para . 202 .
36 a . Lerner, op. cit., p . 37 .
37 a . LamBrecht and c . trucKer, op. cit., p . 10 .
38 d . soKoL and r . comerforD, “antitrust and regulating big data”, Georges Mason Law Review, 
2016, 1129-1161 .
39 see also Z . Dou, r . song and jr Wen, “a large-scale evaluation and analysis of personalizes 
search strategies”, paper presented at the iw3c conference, 2007 .
40 commission decision of 18 February 2010, case m . 5727 Microsoft/Yahoo! Search Business, 
paras . 162 and 223 .
41 us executive office of the president, Big Data and Privacy: a Technological Perspective, 
2014 .
42 see also the uk information commissioner’s office, Big data and data protection, 2014, 
para . 25 observing that variety is the most important characteristic of big data .
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of the respective databases, but also determined by the different types of 
data the competitors have access to and the question which type eventu-
ally will prove to be the most useful for internet advertising purposes .” 43 
this is also an empirical question which should be tested in each case on 
the basis of the type of data and application at hand . in particular, the 
necessity of having more variety of data to improve the quality of the appli-
cation and the algorithm should be carefully analysed .
3. Depreciation value of the data and velocity 
of the analysis
many types of data are transient in value and only relevant over a short 
period of time, hence their depreciation rate is very high . 44 as noted by 
autorité de la concurrence and bundeskartellambt, 45 “historical data, 
while useful for analysing trends in advertising markets, may have compar-
atively little value for instant decision making such as the choice of which 
ad to display in real-time bidding . moreover historical data may be of rela-
tively low value for some actors like search engines in view of the high rate 
of new search queries: as reported by google, 15% of every day people’s 
searches are new, implying that algorithms continuously need new data to 
be effective in providing the most relevant ranking of results to those new 
queries .” thus, the control over these types of data may not in itself give 
rise to a sustainable competitive advantage . 46 however, those data may 
be used to improve existing applications or algorithms or to develop new 
applications or algorithms and those improvements or creations will have 
more permanent value . in other words, the transient value of data may be 
capitalised and transformed into more permanent value of applications’ 
improvements or developments .
other data have more permanent value, such as names, gender, date of 
birth, address and their depreciation rate is much slower . therefore, the 
control of those data gives a more permanent benefit than the control of 
transient data .
43 commission decision of 11 march 2008, case m .4731 Google/ DoubleClick, para . 273 .
44 n .p . schePP and a . WamBach, “on big data and its relevance for market power assessment”, 
Journal of European Competition Law and Practice 7, 2016; sokol and comerford, op. cit .; 
uk competition & markets authority (2015, para . 3 .6) .
45 autorité de la concurrence and bundeskartellambt, op. cit, p . 49 .
46 as noted by competition commissioner vestager: “It might not be easy to build a strong 
market position using data that quickly goes out of date. So we need to look at the type of 
data, to see if it stays valuable”: competition commissioner vestager, “competition in a big 




Finally, data analytics tools, like any other tools or workers, improve with 
experience . however, with the development of artificial intelligence and 
self-learning algorithm, the experience curve may become much steeper 
as computers can learn some tasks much faster than humans . 47 this may, 
in some circumstances, increase the first-mover advantage and make the 
entry of late-comer competitors more difficult . their entry strategies may 
then be limited to acquiring the algorithms or investing in different algo-
rithms trying to provide similar services to end-users, albeit in a different 
manner .
c. relationships between data collection and analysis
as the different parts of the big data value chain are closely related, they 
are be some feedback loops between data collection and data analysis 
which decrease the cost of the former . a first feedback loop, which con-
stitutes a network effect, is linked to the number of users as depicted 
in Figure 1 below and runs as follows: (1) more users means more data; 
(2) which in turn, means better quality of the service in a general way (on 
the basis of general indicators such as language, location etc .) as well as 
in a personalised way (on the basis of the profile that has been built of a 
specific user); (3) which in turn, attracts even more users to the service .
figure 1. The user feedback loop
Source: Lerner, 2014, p. 19
47 ocde, op. cit., p . 11 notes another reason why the experience curve can be steeper in big 
data: the lack of physical bounds to the quantity and variety of data that can be collected in 
a digital world and the unlimited knowledge that can be obtained by running data mining 
algorithms on a variety of datasets, or using data-fusion .
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if this feedback loop takes place, the cost of data collection is higher for 
a new and small platform than for a larger one . 48 however, the existence 
of the feedback loop depends on the relationship between the data and the 
service quality which in turn depends on the type of data and the type of 
application at hand . balto and lane, 49 lerner, 50 lambrecht and trucker 51 
or sokol and comerford 52 submit that in most cases, the service quality 
depends only marginally – if at all – of the user data, hence the feedback 
loop is rarely existent . 53 moreover, even when the feedback loop exists, if 
the data collection cost is very small, the effects of the feedback loop in 
decreasing this cost will be very small as well .
a second feedback loop is linked to the monetisation possibilities as 
depicted in Figure 2 below and runs as follows: (1) more users means more 
data; (2) which in turn, means better targeting possibilities for advertise-
ment when additional data are necessary to improve the targeting algo-
rithms; (3) which in turn, raises the likelihood that users click on the ads 
that are displayed to them, hence increases monetisation under the com-
monly used pay-per-click model; (4) and which attracts more advertisers 
because of the higher probability that a user buys the advertised prod-
uct; (5) which in turn raises again the revenues of the provider; (6) those 
increased possibilities of monetisation increase in turn the possibility of 
investment to improve the service and attract more users; (7) which also 
contributes to the increase of advertisers .
48 F .a . PasquaLe, “privacy, antitrust and power”, Georges Mason Law Review 20(4), 2013, 
1009-1024; a . ezrachi and m .e . stucKe, Virtual Competition: The Promise and Perils of the 
Algorithm-Driven Economy, harvard university press, 2016 .
49 d .a . BaLto and m .c . Lane, “monopolizing water in a tsunami: Finding sensible antitrust rules 
for big data”, Competition Policy International, 2016 .
50 a . Lerner, op. cit.
51 a . LamBrecht and c . trucKer, op. cit.
52 d . soKoL and r . cromerforD; op. cit.
53 according to LamBrecht and trucKer, op. cit., p .  11, data being very cheap relative to 
processing skills suggests that processing skills are more important than data in creating 
value for a firm .
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figure 2: The monetisation feedback loop
Source: Lerner, 2014, p. 40
if this second feedback loop takes place, a new and small platform with 
less users and less data will have more difficulty to target its ads and 
attract advertisers than large platforms, hence less money to improve its 
products . here again, the existence and the intensity of this feedback loop 
needs to be tested on a case-by-case basis and depends on (i) the rela-
tionship between the quantity of data and the improvement of ad target-
ing algorithm, (ii) the relationship between the quality of ad targeting and 
the attraction of advertisers, and (iii) how the platform invests advertise-
ment revenues and finances service improvement . lerner 54 and sokol and 
comerford 55 submit that empirical evidence does not show that a higher 
number of users necessarily leads to a better monetisation . moreover, even 
when the feedback loop exists, if the data collection cost is very small, the 
effects of the feedback loop will be very small as well .
Finally, it is important to note that the development of artificial intelli-
gence may in some circumstances re-inforce those feedback loops as it 
may strengthen the relationship between user data and service quality in 
the first loop and the relationship between user data and ad targeting in 
the second loop . 56 again, this effect should be assessed on a case-by-case 
54 a . Lerner, op. cit., p . 42 .
55 d . soKoL and r . cromerforD; op. cit.
56 as explained in domingos, “the power of machine learning is perhaps best explained by a 
low tech analogy. For example in farming, we plant the seeds, make sure they have enough 
water and nutrients, and reap the grown crops. When it comes to artificial intelligence, 
 Big Data anD marKet PoWer
 bruylant 111
basis and very much depends on the type of data and on the type of self-
learning algorithms at hand .
III. Recommendations for competition agencies
to assess the importance of data in determining market power in a big 
data value chain, i recommend an analytical framework based on three 
principles and two questions .
the first principle is that data are one input, which is important but not 
unique, to develop successful applications and algorithms . other inputs 
are also important such as skilled and creative labour force (in particular 
computer scientists and engineers), efficient hardware, capital and distri-
bution channels . above all, the skills and creativity of the labour force will 
make the success of the applications . the second principle is that big data 
value chains (data collection, storage and analysis) exhibit many direct 
and indirect network effects that need to be captured by the competi-
tion authorities . that requires an understanding and an analysis of each 
part of the value chain but also the interaction and possible feedback 
loops between its different parts instead of analysing one part of the value 
chain in isolation . the third principle is that each big data application and 
algorithm is different and should be analysed on a case-by-case basis . 
therefore, it would be inappropriate to propose detailed recommendations 
at a general level beyond a broad framework for analysis .
with those principles in mind, a competition authority trying to assess 
market power in the big data value chain should answer two main ques-
tions:
the first question relates to the value of the data under examination for the 
applications and the algorithms under examination . that question requires 
determining: (i) the extent of the economies of scale in the data, in par-
ticular what is the marginal benefit of having more data under examina-
tion to improve the quality of the application under examination; (ii) the 
extent of the economies of scope in the data, in particular how important 
it is to combine different types of data to improve the quality of the appli-
cation under examination; (iii) the time depreciation value of the data, in 
learning algorithms are the seeds, data is the soil, and the learned programs are the grown 
plants. This means that the more data is available to a learning algorithm, the more it can 
learn. In short: No data? Nothing to learn. Big data? Lots to learn.”: p . Domingos, The Master 
Algorithm, The Machine Learning Revolution, basic civitas books, 2015 .
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particular the relationship between the age of the data and its relevance to 
develop or improve the application under examination .
the second question relates to the availability of the data under exam-
ination for the applications and the algorithms under examination . this 
question requires determining: (i) the possibility and the costs for an appli-
cation developer to collect data directly from the users, machines, sen-
sors  …; (ii) the possibility and the costs for the application developer to 
buy the data from data broker and in a data market place .
such data availability is to a large extent influenced by the legal frame-
work regarding data collection and use . as this framework is different 
in the eu than in other parts of the world (and within the eu, in some 
member states than in others), as well as for firms offering some services 
(such as traditional telecommunications services) than competitors offer-
ing other services (such as the communication app services), those legal 
differentiations should be factored in the competition analysis .
